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his paper explores the claim that explanation of a group’s behaviour in term of indi-
vidual mental states is, in principle, superior to explanation of that behaviour in terms
of group mental states. We focus on the supposition that individual-level explanation
is superior because it is simpler than group-level explanation. In this paper, we con-
sider three diòerent simplicitymetrics. We argue that on none of thosemetrics does
individual-level explanation achieve greater simplicity than a group-level alternative.
We conclude that an argument against group minds should not lay weight on concerns
of explanatory simplicity.
1 Introduction
In three papers, Robert Rupert presents arguments against group minds (Rupert
2005, 2011, 2014) hese criticisms motivate the conclusion that although the dis-
covery of group minds is an open empirical possibility, there are strong reasons for
thinking that no group minds exist. One of Rupert’s principal arguments against
group minds is an argument from explanatory simplicity. His claim is that, for
any explanation of intelligent behaviour that appeals to group minds, there exists
an alternative explanation couched solely in terms of the minds of individuals.
According to Rupert, an individual-level explanation, which makes no reference
to group minds will be simpler than its group-level alternative, which does make
reference to group minds. Simpler explanations are, everything else being equal,
better explanations. herefore, individual-level explanations are, everything else
being equal, preferable to their more complex group-level alternatives.
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In his invocation of the principle of explanatory simplicity, Rupert overlooks a great
deal of this notion’s complexity. We aim to explicate this notion and its various
dimensions and, in doing so, to assess the relevance of each dimension to the issue
of group-level explanation. We conclude that, whichever way explanatory simplicity
is analysed, there is no warrant for thinking that individual-level explanations are
simpler than group-level alternatives. Hence, this particular route to argue against
the existence of group minds is blocked.
2 A tale of two types of agent
Rupert claims that no matter the intelligent behaviour a group displays, an explanat-
ory story involving only cognitive properties of individuals is always available:
In all of the cases that involve the relevant explananda, there seem
to be available complete causal explanations couched in terms of the
cognitive states of individuals (together with causal contributions of
noncognitive, physical structures). (Rupert 2011, p. 635)
Rupert claims that these individual-level explanations are preferable to group-level
explanations. According to Rupert, this is because individual-level explanations are
more simple. his consideration is the opening move in Rupert’s inference to the
best explanation against the existence of group minds.
Let us see an example of Rupert’s argument in action.
An impressive display of intelligent behaviour by a group occurs when Microso
develops a new operating system (OS). How does a group (Microso) produce this
behaviour? Two types of story could be told. One is formulated exclusively at the
level of individual agents: it refers to the cognitive properties of individual employees,
to the interactions between employees, and to the organisational structure of the
corporation that governs these interactions. he other introduces group agents as
protagonists: it ascribes cognitive properties (such as beliefs, desires, and intentions),
not only to individual employees, but also to groups of individuals, such as teams
within Microso or the corporation as a whole.
What do these two stories look like?
An individual-level explanation ofMicroso’s production of a new OS might begin
by referring to the cognitive states of the individuals comprising the corporation’s
executive: their beliefs that a new OS is required; their desires to produce this new
OS within the next three years; and their intentions to undertake the necessary
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activity to ensure that these desires are fulûlled. he goal of producing a newOS
can be broken down into several sub-goals: the production of its graphical content,
its soware compatibility, its compatibility with a range of hardware, and so on.
Groups of programmers would be tasked with producing the code required to
achieve each of these sub-goals and each programmer would adjust their cognitive
states accordingly.
Each programmer would be ascribed a set of beliefs about the activities they would
need to perform to achieve the sub-goal with which they have been tasked: the
belief that producing a satisfactory user interface will require two years of work;
the belief that a particular programming language would bemost appropriate to
this task; and the belief that weekly consultations with the corporation’s executive
will be necessary, and so on. Each programmer would have a set of relevant desires,
intentions, and other cognitive states: shemight, for example, have the desire to
achieve her sub-goalwithin a particular time frame, to do so to the best of her ability,
to exploit her newly gained competence with a particular programming language,
and so on.
hat an individual employee can be attributed cognitive states requires that the
individual instantiate a cognitive architecture. his is to say that the individual is
structured in such away as to comprise a set ofmechanismswhose tightly integrated
activity contributes causally to that individual’s intelligent behaviour. he cognit-
ive states attributed to the individual are realised by the integrated activity of the
mechanisms which comprise that individual’s cognitive architecture. hese states
enter into causal series in which each state is caused by, and subsequently causes
or modiûes, other cognitive states. hese causally connected series of cognitive
states constitute cognitive processes. And it is in virtue of the realisation of these
cognitive processes that the individual comes to behave intelligently and produce a
wide range of cognitive phenomena (from choosing a suitable route to work in the
morning to successfully coding a graphical user interface).
hus, to treat an individual employee as genuinely cognitive is to attribute to that
individual a related set of cognitive properties. he individual instantiates a cognitive
architecture: a set of integrated cognitivemechanisms (such as working memory,
a language processor, and visual object-recognition mechanisms). he integrated
activity of thesemechanisms realises cognitive states (beliefs, desires, andmemories;
representations ofwords, tasks, and problems; and so on). hese states are connected
in causal series to constitute cognitive processes (decision-making, problem-solving,
and so on). And in virtue of the individual’s instantiation of these various cognitive
properties, that individual is able to produce a variety of cognitive phenomena.
Each individual employee is attributed in the individual-level explanation a set of
related cognitive properties. Crucially, of course, it is only individual employees
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who are attributed cognitive properties, not any extra-individual entity or collection
of entities.
An individual-level explanation ofMicroso’s behaviour would of course need to
appeal to more than this. It would need to refer to the various processes by which
individual employees communicate the content of their cognitive states, and the
results of their cognitive processes, to other employees. hese communicative pro-
cesses would include face-to-face linguistic interactions, the production of written
memos, email, video-conferencing, record-keeping, and so on. An individual-level
explanation would also need to refer to the non-cognitive physical structures used
to facilitate individual cognitive processes and inter-individual communicative pro-
cesses. A corporation likeMicrosomakes use of all sorts of digital computers, hard
drives and other storage devices, telecommunications devices, and old-fashioned
pen and paper, amongst other things. Finally, of crucial importance would be a
description of the corporation’s organisational structure and the procedures and
rules which determine how the activity of its numerous individual employees is
coordinated and channelled towards the production of a new OS. his would in-
clude reference to sets of implicit and explicit rules, the hierarchical organisation of
employees, the corporation’s departmental structure, the procedural standards for
communication between departments, and so on.
An individual-level causal explanation ofMicroso’s production of a newOS would
clearly be a complex andmultifaceted explanation that wouldmake reference to
an enormous number of individual cognitive properties, interactive and commu-
nicative processes, rules and organisational structures, and various non-cognitive
structures and processes.
What about the group-level story? A group-level explanation would ascribe cognit-
ive properties, not only to individual employees, but also to groups of individuals.
he relevant groups may be of various sizes and their membership could overlap.
he groups may include small teams of programmers, larger engineering teams,
entire soware divisions, or the corporation as awhole. Just as individual employees
are attributed a set of related cognitive properties, so a group would be treated as
a cognitive system that instantiates a cognitive architecture and realises cognitive
states that combine in causal series to constitute cognitive processes.
For example,Microso’s organisational structure, which plays the crucial role of
integrating and coordinating the activity of individual employees in the individual-
level explanation,may be equated with a cognitive architecture. his architecture
is comprised of a large set ofmechanisms whose activation may realise cognitive
states. But whereas the cognitivemechanisms comprising an individual employee’s
cognitive architecture consist of various neural systems in the employee’s brain,
the cognitivemechanisms that compriseMicroso’s cognitive architecture consist
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of groups of individual employees and their supporting physical apparatus. he
group-level cognitive states are realised by individual employees in interaction with
each other and with their supporting physical apparatus. he group-level cognitive
processes are the causal series in which each of these cognitive states is caused by,
and causes or modiûes, the others.
his presentation of the group-level explanation suggests that it is a rival to the
individual-level explanation in the sense that it might eliminate the need for any
individual-level talk: individual-level cognitive properties, inter-individual interac-
tion, and non-cognitive physical structures would be discarded in favour of group
cognitive properties. But it need not be so. We will suppose in what follows that the
group-level explanation retains reference to the various individual-level cognitive
properties and non-cognitive physical structures described in the individual-level
explanation.
It is conceivable that the similarity between a particular group and a cognitive agent
is too superûcial, or in other ways insuõcient, to justify attribution of cognitive
properties to that group. Both advocates and critics of group cognition agree that
some level of functional similarity – the correct level of which is disputed – between
a group and an individual cognitive agent is required in order for the attribution of
mental properties to a group to bewarranted at all. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate
a discussion of explanatory simplicity, these considerations will be temporarily set
aside. he claim at issue is not that Microso’s production of a new OS genuinely
constitutes a real-world example of group cognition. he claim is that, if a case such
as theMicroso example did warrant both an individual-level and a group-level
explanation, and if two such complete causal explanations could indeed be given, the
individual-level explanation would be superior in terms of explanatory simplicity.
Granted our task is to assess explanatory simplicity (and not some other dimension
of adequacy of group-level explanation), it is important to tally up, as Rupert does,
the nature and quantity of additional postulates made by group-level explanation.
he additional postulates of group-level explanation consist of an additional set of
cognitive properties: the instantiation, in virtue of the corporation’s organisational
structure, of a cognitive architecture; the realisation, in virtue of this architecture,
of cognitive states over and above those realised by individual employees; and the
realisation via the causal series of these cognitive states, of cognitive processes over
and above those realised by individual employees.
Assuming, as per the above concession, that the group-level explanation retains
reference to all individual-level cognitive properties and non-cognitive physical
structures, the two explanations appear to sit roughly in a relation of containment.
he group-level explanation posits all that the individual-level explanation posits,
plus an additional set of properties, the group-level cognitive properties. herefore
5
it seems reasonable to conclude, as Rupert does, that individual-level explanation
must be the simpler hypothesis. If one can explain the group’s behaviour without
introducing additional cognitive properties possessed by groups, why, everything
else being equal, introduce those group-level cognitive properties?
he aim of this paper is to show that this conclusion is unwarranted. Individual-level
explanation is not simpler than, and hence (all else being equal) preferable to, group-
level explanation. Our strategy in this paper is to examine how simplicity should
be measured. We consider three approaches: qualitative parsimony, qualitative
parsimony, and theoretical elegance. We argue that on none of thesemeasures does
individual-level explanation count as more simple than group-level explanation.
We conclude that concerns about simplicity cannot be straightforwardly used, as
Rupert wants, to argue against the existence of group minds.
3 Qualitative parsimony
One dimension of simplicity is parsimony. Parsimony concerns the number of
entities posited by an explanation. How does one go about counting these entities?
here seem to be two possibilities: count the kinds of entity postulated or count the
number of entities postulated and subsumed under each kind. Counting the number
of kinds gives ameasure of qualitative parsimony; counting the number of entities
subsumed under each kind gives ameasure of quantitative parsimony (Lewis 1973).
Qualitative parsimony is the focus of this section; quantitative parsimony is the
focus of the next.
How do considerations of qualitative parsimony apply in theMicroso case? On
the assumption that both the individual-level and group-level explanations are oth-
erwise adequate, the individual-level explanation might appear more qualitatively
parsimonious for the simple fact that it includes only those kinds that are already
in use throughout standard cognitive science. In other words, the individual-level
explanation helps itself only to the cognitive kinds of architecture, state, and process
that are already attributed to individual humans in cognitive scientiûc explanations.
In contrast, the group-level explanation of theMicroso’s production of a new OS
makes additional postulates: it attributes cognitive properties to Microso at the
group-level.
It is of crucial importance, however, to the group-level explanation that the addi-
tional postulates involve attribution of the same kind of properties to Microso as
are attributed to its individual employees. he architecture that the group-level
explanation takes Microso to instantiate is, ex hypothesi, of the same cognitive kind
as the architecture instantiated by individuals. And the states and processes that
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Microso is attributed in virtue of its instantiating this cognitive architecture are
again, ex hypothesi, cognitive states and processes of the same kind as are attributed
to its individual humans.
he cognitive states attributed to Microso are additional instances of individual-
level cognitive states: beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. he group-level states
are individually distinct from any of the individual-level cognitive states attributed
to particular employees. But the group-level states are individually distinct in the
sense that they constitute new instances of the same cognitive kind as are attributed
to individual employees. he claim – the innovation – that makes the group-level
explanation of Microso’s production of a new OS interesting is that Microso
instantiates additional instances of the same kind of cognitive properties as are
attributed to individual humans. he same is true of any group-level cognitive
explanation. hese explanations are interesting precisely because of the similarity
they posit between individual-level properties and group-level properties. A group-
level explanation that attributed utterly alien cognitive properties – so diòerent as
to fail to fall under any same-kind relation to those of individual humans – would
not count as a group mind hypothesis at all.
Understood correctly, group-level explanations do not postulate additional cognitive
kinds, only additional instances of existing kinds. herefore, an appeal to qualitative
parsimony as a strategy to argue against group-level explanations wouldmiss the
mark. here are no extraneous kinds to ‘shave oò ’ by dispensing with group-level
explanation, only attribution of existing kinds to new particulars.
4 Quantitative parsimony
Might group-level explanations be less simple than individual-level alternatives
because group-level explanations postulate extra instances of cognitive kinds? Does
a group-level explanation of, say,Microso’s behaviour introduce unnecessary in-
stances of cognitive architecture, states and processes? In this section, we argue that
concerns about quantitative parsimony do not tell against group-level explanation.¹
Nolan (1997) provides an instructive case study on the value of quantitative parsi-
mony. Nolan’s case concerns the postulation of the neutrino in the explanation of
beta decay. In attempting to explain a puzzling drop in the energy of nuclei during
1. Appeal to quantitative parsimony is far from uncontroversial as ameans of selecting between
rival explanations. Lewis (1973) says, ‘I subscribe to the general view that qualitative parsimony is
good in a philosophical or empirical hypothesis; but I recognise no presumption whatever in favour
of quantitative parsimony’ (p. 87). Oliver (1996) argues that, despite our undeniable bias towards
explanations with quantitative parsimony, we should not trust this as a guide to the truth.
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beta decay,Wolfgang Pauli postulated the existence of a new kind of subatomic
particle, the neutrino. When developing the neutrino-based explanation, there was
no availablemeans of determining howmany of the new subatomic particles were
released during beta decay. he total mass-energy to be accounted was known, but
whether this mass-energy was best accounted by one, two, or amillion neutrinos
was an open question. Once the release of a single neutrino has been postulated,
why not postulate the release of two neutrinos each with half themass-energy of
one neutrino? Or a million neutrinos with a millionth of the mass-energy? At
the time, the one-neutrino and themillion-neutrino explanations could both have
accommodated the empirical data. Nolan argues that it was nevertheless rational, in
light of consideration of quantitative parsimony, for Pauli to favour the one-neutrino
explanation. Nolan defends this in two ways.
First, onemaymake a brute appeal to intuition. hat the one-neutrino explanation
is superior to themillion-neutrino explanation (or any other such explanation) is
an intuition that many otherwise rational enquirers share. It may seem reasonable
to endorse this, at least pending countervailing evidence, even if it does not admit
of explicit justiûcation. Second, onemay appeal to the successful track record of
quantitatively parsimonious explanations. Quantitative parsimony has led to the
selection of explanations that have gone on to prove their worth in other ways. A
case in point is the one-neutrino explanation. Pauli’s explanation was subsequently
vindicated. Even if the reasons for the success of quantitative parsimony remain ob-
scure, its success alone appears to lend some justiûcation to the principle’s continued
application.
he cases in which quantitative parsimony play a part might seem trivial when
the number of entities postulated (for example, atoms or subatomic particles) is
compared with the potentially inûnite number of other entities in the universe. his
seems to pose a problem if one endorses an ‘inûnite ontology’ view of the universe.
One could argue that against this inûnite background, a numerical increase in
entities of one particular kind is trivial or negligible. Why should it matter that an
explanation adds a fewmore entities to our scientiûc ontology when this ontology
already includes the inûnity of other kinds of entities which occupy an inûnite
universe?
Against this thought, Nolan contends that, irrespective of the potential inûnity of
entities subsumed under all extant kinds, it is nevertheless important to minimise
the number of entities subsumed by any one particular kind. hus, for example, even
against the background of inûnitemathematical entities to which themathematical
Platonist is committed, the addition of ‘seventeen million little neutral particles
being produced in every case of Beta-decay’, as opposed to the addition of just one
such particle, still makes a signiûcant diòerence (Nolan 1997, p. 340).
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Wewill followNolan in his understanding of quantitative parsimony. Recall that the
group-level explanation claims that Microso, as a group, instantiates a cognitive
architecture with instances of cognitive states over and above those of its individual
employees. Is an individual-level explanation more quantitatively parsimonious
than this group-level account (assuming, as above, that both explanations can be
given)?
At ûrst glance, the answer appears to be a clear ‘yes’. At the end of the previous
sectionwe said that the group-level explanation posits extra instances of cognitive ar-
chitectures, states, and processes, although it does not posit new kinds. Granted this,
the group-level explanation appears to do worse in terms of quantitative parsimony:
it posits more instances of cognitive properties than individual-level explanation.
On closer examination, however, the case against group-level explanation is not so
clear.
An initial objection that might be levelled by an advocate of individual-level explan-
ation is that the group-level explanation attributes to the Microso corporation
a cognitive architecture, whilst at the same time appealing to the cognitive archi-
tectures of the individual employees. If this attribution involves the postulation
of an additional entity, then it seems to fall foul of considerations of quantitative
parsimony when compared to individual-level alternatives.
Understood correctly, however, the group-level explanation does not postulate the
instantiation of a cognitive architecture as an additional entity over and above those
postulated in the individual-level explanation. Rather, it identiûes the organisational
structure of the corporation, as described in the individual-level explanation, with
a genuinely cognitive architecture. he individual-level explanation must already
include this organisational structure in order to explain the interactions that take
place between the corporation’s individual employees. It is committed to there
being an executive, external information stores, a variety of sub-components in the
form of teams of individual employees, and various other non-cognitive physical
structures. In order to make sense of the interactions between these features and to
explain how they are coordinated in the production of a newOS, the individual-level
explanation cannot merely postulate their existence. It must also give an account of
the rules and procedures governing their interaction.
In attributing to the corporation a cognitive architecture, the group-level explanation
does not postulate an extra structure over and above the structure already described
at the individual-level. It claims that, properly understood, this structure is an
instance of a cognitive architecture.
What about the additional cognitive states and processes? It seems that theymust
violate the principle of quantitative parsimony. Even ifMicroso as a corporation
instantiates a cognitive architecture, an advocate of quantitative parsimony could
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say that the cognitive states attributed to the corporation in the group-level explan-
ation constitute extraneous additions to number of instances of cognitive states
postulated in the individual-level explanation. he individual-level explanation
makes reference to the cognitive states of individual employees. he group-level
explanation makes reference to these cognitive states plus an extra set of cognitive
states at group level. he group-level explanation therefore seems inferior in terms
of quantitative parsimony.
Let us pause and consider thismore carefully. First,we need to ask how the instances
of cognitive states postulated by each explanation are counted. Consider the cognit-
ive state of intending to develop a new OS. Let us suppose that the individual-level
explanation attributes this state to the corporation’s CEO, amongst other individual
employees. he group-level explanation retains these attributions and, additionally,
attributes the state of intending to develop a new OS to the corporation as a whole.
Here is onemethod bywhichwe could go about counting cognitive states. Beginning
with the CEO,we say that his state of intending to develop a newOS is one cognitive
state to which the individual-level explanation is committed. On top of this, let
us suppose that he simultaneously believes that the development of a newOS is a
ûnancial necessity. his gives us two cognitive states. Simultaneously, he desires
to make as much money as possible for the corporation during his time as CEO,
giving us a total of three cognitive states. Assuming, for the sake of brevity, that the
CEO’s cognitive states are limited to only these three, we could go on to count the
cognitive states of all the other individual employees in a similar manner. At the
end of this process, we add up the cognitive states that have been attributed to each
individual employee, and this gives us the total number of cognitive states to which
the individual-level explanation is committed.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the group-level explanation is committed to
those individual-level cognitive states too. But it goes further and attributes cognitive
states at the group-level. We count these group-level cognitive states, add them to
the total number of individual-level cognitive states, and this gives us the number of
cognitive states to which the group-level explanation is committed. Patently, using
this method of counting cognitive states, the group-level explanation is committed
to a greater number of cognitive states than the individual-level explanation.
his method of counting cognitive states gives us the total number of occurrent
cognitive states attributed by the explanations. hemethodmight seem appealing.
However, it relies on an implausibly atomistic view of the nature of cognitive states.
Cognitive states ought not to be treated as entities in the same way as material
objects whose existence can be treated independently of the existence of all other
such objects. If we are counting the number of chairs in a room, then counting only
the ‘occurrent’ chairs – those that are present in the room at one particular point
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in time – is unproblematic. he existence of each of these chairs, and the location
of each chair, stands largely independent of the existence or location of any other
chair. he existence of any single chair, and the location of the chair, entails almost
nothing about the existence or location of any other chair. Cognitive states are
diòerent, or so the objection goes. he fact that a cognitive architecture instantiates
a particular cognitive state at a given moment in time does entail further facts about
other cognitive states. he existence of a particular cognitive state cannot be treated
in isolation from other cognitive states.
his approach to cognitive states falls under the broad heading of dispositionalism.
he core of dispositionalist theories – the idea that is of the greatest signiûcance for
the discussion of group-level cognitive states – can be illustrated by some simple
examples. We will give these to demonstrate the strength of the view as a broadly
correct characterisation of cognitive states, and superior to the occurrent character-
isation above.
Consider that I believe that my house contains six rooms. At a given point in time
I am laying down plans for my latest DIY project and this has given me cause to
think about the total number of rooms in my house. I say to myself ‘there are six
rooms in my house’. It seems entirely reasonable that at this given point in time, we
should attribute to me the occurrent belief that my house has six rooms. It seems
uncontroversial that I have at least this one belief at this point in time.
What about the belief that my house contains more than three rooms? I might never
have cause during the course ofmy DIY project to entertain this as a proposition,
and it might plausibly be the case that at no point in my life does the belief that
my house contains more than three rooms ever become occurrent. Does this mean
that I do not believe that my house contains more than three rooms? Maintaining
that I do not seems to neglect a crucial feature of beliefs. I am disposed to assent to
statements or answer questions in accordance with the non-occurrent belief.
It is the important sense in which I believe that my house contains more than three
rooms, regardless of the actual occurrence of this belief, which is captured by the
dispositionalist claim we are interested in here. he claim is that, in virtue of the
structure possessed by my cognitive architecture, I am disposed to respond in a
particular way to a whole set of possible stimuli and other dispositional mental
states – to assent to a whole set of possible statements, to answer questions in a
particular way, and so on.
Returning to Microso example, the CEO was attributed three cognitive states, one
of which was the intention to develop a new OS. Construed in dispositional terms,
however, his single state of intending entails many others. If the CEO intends to
develop a new OS, he presumably also intends to develop a new OS which can be
made available for the use ofMicroso’s customers. He intends that this OS will run
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successfully on existing hardware, that itwill enable the use ofmore than one piece of
soware, and so on. And these entailments are not limited to intentions. If the CEO
intends to develop a new OS he presumably also believes that the development of a
newOS is possible, and he believes that it is within the capability of the corporation
to develop a new OS. Presumably he also has beliefs about what an OS is, what a
corporation is, and his position within the corporation such that he can intend to
develop a new OS in the ûrst place, and so on.
To say that the CEO instantiates the cognitive state of intending to develop a new
OS but none of the other inferentially-related cognitive states seems to neglect an
essential feature ofwhat it is to instantiate a cognitive state. Wewant to suggest, then,
that cognitive states are not best characterised as solely occurrent states. Rather, in
virtue of having a cognitive architecture and instantiating cognitive states, the CEO
possesses a whole set of related dispositional mental states.
If we treat cognitive states in dispositional terms, how do we count them?
here are presumably limits in principle to the number of occurrent states that
a single cognitive architecture can instantiate at any given point in time, even if
those limits are diõcult to discern. Limited neural resources and limited number
of cognitivemechanisms that comprise the cognitive architecture of an individual
of ûnite sizemean that the number of occurrent cognitive states instantiated at any
given moment is ûnite.
In contrast, the number of dispositions that an individual has, in virtue of their
instantiating a cognitive architecture is, in principle, unlimited. If I believe that my
house contains six rooms, and I also believe that my house contains more than three
rooms, presumably I also believe thatmy house contains fewer than seven rooms. I am
disposed to assent to the statement that my house contains fewer than seven rooms.
Surely, then, I also believe that my house contains fewer than eight rooms, and fewer
than nine rooms, and ten rooms, and so on ad inûnitum. Construed dispositionally,
there is no point in this sequence at which it makes sense to terminate. here is no
principled limit on the number of rooms to which I would be disposed to respond
that my house contains fewer.
In theMicroso case, there is likewise no principled limit to the number of cognitive
states we should attribute to its CEO once it has been accepted that he intends
to develop a new OS. he simplest example of this fact could be given just by
considering that, if the CEO intends to develop one new OS, he also intends to
develop less than two new OSs, and less than three new OS, and so on. It is not
just that the limits to the number of these cognitive states are diõcult to discern.
Rather, there are no such limits. here seems, then, to be the very real possibility
that, construed in dispositional terms, the number of instances of cognitive states
falling under each kind in individual-level explanation ofMicroso’s behaviour is
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unlimited.
If individual-level explanation is committed to an unlimited number of instances
of cognitive states (beliefs, intentions, desires, etc.), then the addition of further
instances of these kinds attributed to groups would oòer no overall increase in num-
ber. Even if the number of group-level cognitive instances were similarly unlimited,
there would still be no overall increase. his is bad news for anyone wishing to
use quantitative parsimony to argue in favour of individual-level explanation. Our
ûrst intuition that the number of individual cognitive states plus the number of
group cognitive statesmust be greater than the number of individual cognitive states
breaks down once we introduce an unlimited number of dispositional cognitive
states.
Despite its initial intuitive plausibility, quantitative parsimony does not lend cre-
dence to individual-level explanation being more simple than group-level explana-
tion. Insofar as cognitive property instances can be counted at all, adding further
instances via group-level explanation does not increase our total commitments.
5 heoretical elegance
he ûnal measure of explanatory simplicity we consider is theoretical elegance. he-
oretical elegance concerns the structure and length of the explanation, rather than
the entities or kinds to which it is committed.².
Two ways of understanding theoretical elegance are considered below: explanations
that minimise the number of primitive predicates employed, and explanations that
minimise the length of the explanation. We argue that neither provides the grounds
for thinking that individual-level explanations aremore simple than group-level
alternatives.
Explanations employ primitive and non-primitive predicates. Both kinds of predic-
ate are used to express the ideas that a theory contains. he primitive predicates
are those which are undeûned: they receive no deûnition or analysis within the
explanation. he non-primitive predicates are deûned: they receive a deûnition in
terms of the predicates included elsewhere within the explanation.
In theMicroso example, the primitive predicates might include has the belief that
a new OS is required, has the desire to produce the new OS within the next three years,
and so on. Additionally,many predicates related to the non-cognitive properties
of physical structures and the predicates needed to explain the organisation of the
corporation are likely to be primitive.
2. Baker (2013).
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According to our assumption in Section 2, the group-level explanation will include
all the primitive predicates of the individual-level explanation. he additional
postulates in the group-level explanation are the group-level cognitive properties,
and therefore the only additional predicates in the group-level explanation could be
those predicates relating speciûcally to the instantiation of cognitive properties at
the group-level: those needed to explain why and how a group-level architecture is
a group-level architecture; why and how the additional states being postulated are
group-level states, and so on.
hese group-level predicates are the subject matter of group-level explanations and
will therefore need to be explained and deûned within the group-level explanation.
hese group-level predicates will not remain undeûned because it is the concern of
such an explanation to explain why and how cognitive properties are instantiated at
the group level, and what it means to have the group-level properties in the sense
intended by the explanation. herefore, the (additional) group-level predicates will
not be primitive.
his means that the group-level explanation will not include any more primitive
predicates than the individual-level explanation. So, with regard to elegance qua
minimum number of primitive predicates, group-level explanations are no worse
oò than individual-level explanations.
If theMicroso group-level explanation replaces reference to individual-level cog-
nitive properties and the various non-cognitive physical structures mentioned in
the individual-level explanation with reference to only a single cognitive system
and its properties, group-level explanation could be shorter. Even if group-level
explanation retains reference to all the properties and structures of individual-level
explanation, there will nevertheless be aspects of the group’s activity whose lengthy
individual-level explanations can be replaced with shorter group-level explanations.
For example, consider retrieval of information from a non-cognitive information
store, such as a hard drive. For an individual-level explanation, thiswould need to be
explained with description of an individual employee’s processes of interaction with
the hard drive and how information on the hard drive inuences that individual’s
cognitive states and processes. his would involve, for example, facts about the
physical encoding of the information on the hard drive, the content of the informa-
tion, the employee’s sensory interaction with the hard drive, their conceptualisation
of the information, and their endorsement of the information. he explanation
may plausibly draw on other elements too, such as translation between natural
languages in order for the employee to capable of conceptualising the information
in the ûrst place. he explanation also needs to explain how, once the information
has aòected the cognitive states of an individual, this then aòects the behaviour of
the corporation as a whole.
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In a group-level explanation, this set of processes by which the information con-
tained on a hard drive comes to inuence an individual’s cognitive states and pro-
cesses, and by which these states and processes are communicated to and inuence
other individual employees, could be given amuch shorter explanation in terms
of the corporation’s group-level cognitive states being inuenced by states of the
corporation’s long-term memory. hus, even if group-level explanation elsewhere
retains reference to the same individual-level cognitive properties and non-cognitive
structures as individual-level explanation, there will be cases where group-level
explanation can compress non-trivial sets of statementsmade by the individual-level
explanation of certain processes.
hismirrors a discussion byClark andChalmers (1998) of the appeal of the extended
mind hypothesis. Clark and Chalmers argue that when explaining Otto’s behaviour,
certain stages in the explanation become unnecessary once one switches to an
explanation couched in terms of a single extended cognitive system (p. 13). he
description ofOtto’s transit to heMuseum ofModern Art need not, they argue,
make reference toOtto’s belief thatheMuseumofModernArt’s location is recorded
in his notebook, or to the ûne-grained details of Otto’s sensorimotor interaction
with his notebook (p. 13). In the extended-mind version of the explanation, this
whole process is glossed simply as the retrieval of information from Otto’s long-
term extendedmemory in the service of fulûlling his desires. he non-extended
alternative involving a detour through Otto’s beliefs about his notebook takes ‘one
step too many’ and is ‘pointlessly complex’ (p. 13).
Likewise, if a group-level explanation of Microso’s production of a new OS is
available,many stages of the individual-level explanation seem pointlessly complex.
Ensembles of processes can be glossed as the execution of a single group-level
cognitive process, such as retrieval of information from long-term memory. he
set of statements describing this will be signiûcantly shorter than the statements
required to explain the same process in purely individual-level terms. As a result,
even if the group-level explanation retains reference to individual-level cognitive
properties and non-cognitive structures, there will be opportunities to substantially
reduce the number of statements used in the explanation and there is a possibility
that the group-level explanation will be shorter andmore elegant.
6 Conclusion
Individual-level explanations of intelligent behaviour are not always simpler than
group-level explanations. his is not to say that particular individual-level explana-
tions are not superior to group-level explanations. Nor is it to rule out an argument
that individual-level explanation is better based on another, non-simplicity-based,
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metric. Nor is it to rule out a general non-explanatory-value-based argument against
group minds. Our aim has only been to show that appeal to explanatory simplicity
is not enough to show that group-level explanation is inferior to individual-level
explanation.
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